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ABSTRACT
REFUGEES AS A CATALYZER OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY:
EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT
HUSEYIN EMRE CEYHUN
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS M.A. THESIS, JUNE 2020
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. ABDURRAHMAN AYDEMIR
Keywords: Syrian Refugees, Democratic Attitudes, Arab Barometer, World Values
Survey
I developed a theory to understand the impact of refugee resettlement on the political
attitudes of citizens living in host countries with authoritarian governments. While
refugees may engender social discontent against existing institutions, their political
implications need not necessarily be the rise of authoritarian and anti-democratic
attitudes, as often occurs in Western countries. In authoritarian countries, anti-
establishment feelings may generate social discontent against authoritarian institu-
tions, leading to an increase in favorable sentiments toward democracy. Adopting
difference-in-difference and instrumental variable approaches for causal inference, I
test my theory in Jordan and show that the presence of Syrian refugees increases
anti-establishment feelings in society and the likelihood of supporting democracy.
This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that even though aca-
demics and Western media pose migration as a serious threat to democracy, any
analysis about the impact of migration on public opinion should be conditional on
institutional contexts.
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ÖZET
DEMOKRASİ DESTEK KATALATÖRÜ OLARAK MÜLTECİLER: DOĞAL
BİR DENEYDEN DELİL
HÜSEYİN EMRE CEYHUN
EKONOMİ DEPARTMANI YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, HAZİRAN 2020
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. ABDURRAHMAN AYDEMİR
Anahtar Kelimeler: Suriyeli Mülteciler, Demokratik yönelimler, Arab Barometresi,
Dünya Değerler Araştırması
Mültecilerin otoriter ülkelerde yaşayan vatandaşların politik düşünceleri üzerine etk-
isi hakkında bir teori geliştirdim. Mülteciler bir ülkedeki kurumlara karşı sosyal
memnuniyetsiz yaratabilirken bunun politik etkisi, batıda olduğu gibi, otoriter
yada demokrasi karşıtı düşüncelere yönelim olmayabilir. Otoriter ülkelerde, ku-
rum karşıtı düşünceler otoriter kurumlara karşı bir memnuniyetsizlik yaratabilir
ve bu demokrasiye yönelimi artırabilir. Farklar içinde farklar ve enstrümental
değişken metotlarını kullanarak, geliştirdiğim teoriyi Ürdün üzerinde test ediyorum
ve Suriyeli mültecilerin Ürdünlülerin kurumlara karşı olan duygularını artırdığını
ve demokrasiye olan inançlarını artırdığını gösteriyorum. Bu çalışma, akademisyen-
lerin ve Batı medyasının mültecileri demokrasiye bir tehdit oluşturduğu önergesine
rağmen mülteciler üzerine yapılacak herhangi bir çalışmanın bir ülkedeki kurumlara
koşullanması gerektiğini göstererek literatüre katkı sağlamaktadır.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Given that the world faces the highest number of refugees in history, it is important
to ask: what are the political implications of refugee influxes for public opinion? Can
refugees affect fundamental changes in public preferences of governance systems?
Literature, as well as Western media, implicitly assumes that the rise of far-right
and populist parties, authoritarian in nature (Mudde 2004), fuels anti-establishment
and authoritarian feelings in host societies. Anti-refugee discourse widely adopted
by populists creates an indirect link between refugees and authoritarian attitudes in
Western societies. However, this inquiry begs a couple of follow-up questions: What
are the main variables that determine the way that refugee influxes influence public
opinion towards democracy? What are the intermediary mechanisms through which
refugees promote certain types of governance? It is these questions that I aim to
explore in this research.
The institutions within a political system and the way they interact with society
writ large is a determining factor in whether new refugee populations will gener-
ate pro- authoritarian sentiments. While refugees may engender social discontent
against existing institutions, their political implications need not necessarily be the
rise of authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes. In authoritarian countries, anti-
establishment feelings may generate social discontent against authoritarian institu-
tions, leading people to consider other types of political governance such as democ-
racy. I expect this outcome to be especially salient in countries where authoritarian
institutions cannot bring economic prosperity to their constituencies.
I test this theory on an authoritarian country that has been struck with refugee
exoduses since its independence: Jordan. With its authoritarian ruling that limits
democratic practices to a great extent, Jordan is a suitable case to test this theory.
By combining the data taken from the World Values Survey Wave IV - VI and the
Arab Barometer Wave II-V and adopting difference-in-difference and instrumental
variable approaches, I establish a statistical causal relationship between the presence
of Syrian settlements and Jordanians’ anti-establishment feelings and support for
democracy.
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Also, I examine the extent to which economic mechanisms are influential in changing
political attitudes towards democracy. Studies on the populist parties in the West
have discussed various mechanisms associated with the anti-establishment feelings in
society, ranging from economic mechanisms to cultural mechanisms and to political
polarization (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018). Considering the importance of
economic well-being in the sustenance of authoritarian ruling (Teorell 2010;Pepinsky
2009), I believe economic motivations can provide comprehensible views about the
formation of anti-establishment feelings in society living under authoritarian insti-
tutions even though there might be other context-dependent mechanisms, such as
cultural or security-related mechanisms.
My analysis indicates that Syrians are associated with a significant loss of jobs for
male Jordanians. Moreover, they have led Jordanians to be less likely to satisfy
with national, as well as their households’, economic conditions. These estimations
demonstrate the perceptions of the economic strain put by Syrians. Moreover, my
results indicate that Syrians are not the only ones blamed by Jordanians for the
deterioration of Jordan’s economy. Jordanians have also become dissatisfied with
the economic management of their government. To be precise, they have become
less likely to appreciate the government in running the economy, creating employ-
ment opportunities, and decreasing in equality in society as the presence of Syrians
increases in a given governorate. As a result of the perceptions of economic deteri-
oration and the blame put on the government, Jordanians have become less likely
to cite confidence in political institutions, proxying the extent of institutional legit-
imacy.
There are two reasons why citizens under authoritarian institutions might want to
support democracy as they are dissatisfied with their institutional system. First,
they may believe that democracy can bring economic prosperity to their country
(Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012; Ceyhun 2017). However,
such conceptualization of democracy might not be universal (Dalton, Shin, and Jou
2007). Second, the status quo recalcitrant to any reform attempt may lead citizens
to desire a political system where they can voice their economic concerns freely
and initiate necessary reforms. Even though I cannot test whether these reasons
are valid, my results demonstrate that Syrians have led Jordanians to cite greater
support for democracy.
This research has several contributions to the literature. Previous research on polit-
ical preferences and refugee influxes focuses on either a) voting behavior (Vasilakis
2018; Altindag and Kaushal 2017); b) attitudes towards refugees (Espenshade and
Hempstead 1996; Hangartner et al. 2019); or c) preferences over welfare policies
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(Alesina, Murard, and Rapoport 2019). I improve this line of research and demon-
strate that the impact of refugees on public opinion may operate on a much deeper
level: it can change people’s preferences over political regimes. Also, previous re-
search provides only suggestive evidence about the possible mechanisms at play.
This research establishes a causal mechanism between the presence of refugees and
the change in public opinion and outline the steps in this process. Also, focusing
on a country outside of the West, this research demonstrates the importance of in-
stitutions in determining the attitudinal outcomes of refugees. However, the most
important contribution of this research to the literature is that migration does not
necessarily constitute a threat to democratic sentiments in society, an opinion widely
held by scholars and Western media.
I start with an overview of the literature discussing the impact of refugees on lo-
cal economies and how refugees might lead to the anti-establishment feelings and
greater support for democracy in society, followed by a brief background on Jordan.
Presenting estimation strategies and results, I conclude with possible implications
of this study and the room for further research.
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2. THEORY
At the dawn of the second decade of the 21st century, democracy in the world have
regressed on a rare occasion. Attacks on democratic ideals, such as toleration and
equality, from political parties with authoritarian leanings, be it right-wing pop-
ulist or anti-establishment parties, have led to a considerable amount of decrease
in trust in institutions among Western societies. In this context, the widespread
use of anti-migrant discourse adopted by these parties have appealed to the most
vulnerable part of society: those who have been severely suffered from the market
implications of globalization and neo-liberal policies. As a result, populist leaders
have made various electoral successes throughout the West, ranging from charismatic
populist leaders getting nomination from mainstream political parties, such as Don-
ald Trump, to grassroots populist movements that secured considerable amount of
seats in the legislative branches, such as the AfD in Germany.
The relationship between migration and the deconsolidation of democracy in the
West, mainly driven by the success of populist parties, have led academics and
Western media to devote a significant amount of time to understand the possible
mechanisms through which migration hurts Western democracies Turner 2019;Gal-
ston 2018 and why people have leaned towards populist discourses and voted for
populist parties (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014). However, we have limited
knowledge about the political implications of migrants in authoritarian contexts.
Given that authoritarian countries have distinct political characteristics in dealing
with their citizens, it is imperative to examine political implications of migrants on
public opinion in authoritarian countries.
The existing literature has contended that the economic well-being of the populace
is crucial to the sustaining authoritarian rule (Teorell 2010;Pepinsky 2009). The
Middle East, in that context, is no exception: social contracts in the region are de-
pendent on the extensive use of unproductive rents - money coming from oil revenues,
foreign assistance or remittances – to placate society and buy their acquiescence to
restrictions on political rights. The Arab Uprisings, which shook the foundations of
authoritarian ruling in the region, was in large part spurred by economic grievances
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in Middle Eastern societies as authoritarian institutions failed to deliver on previous
promises of economic security (Campante and Chor 2012). Thus, the importance of
economic issues in authoritarian countries constitutes a reasonable account as to how
anti-establishment feelings can be generated in society. In authoritarian contexts,
these sentiments may manifest as support for democratic systems for the reasons I
explain below.
Figure 2.1 presents the causal mechanism I propose to study between the arrival
of refugees and the support for democracy among citizens. It should be noted that
even though other mechanisms, such as security-related or cultural mechanisms, may
be influential in the extent that people nurture anti-establishment feelings against
authoritarian institutions and support for democracy as a result, I focus on the
impact of refugees on host’ labor market outcomes due to the centrality of economic
issues in almost every authoritarian country. More specifically, given that security-
related or cultural mechanisms are highly context-dependent, economic motivations
can provide solid and generalizable explanations as to how the presence of refugees
may induce greater support for democracy in authoritarian countries.
Figure 2.1 Proposed Causal Mechanism
The possible impacts of refugees on local economies have been well established in
literature on labor economics (Card 1990; Maystadt et al. 2019). However, academic
studies mostly using migration shocks as natural experiments yield mixed results.
While some studies find small or no negative effect of refugees on local economies
(Card 1990; Friedberg 2001; Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba 2019), others find much
larger negative effects of refugees (Glitz 2012; Aydemir and Kırdar 2017; Dustmann,
Schönberg, and Stuhler 2016). These mixed results are also present in research
analyzing the impact of Syrian refugees on labor market outcomes (Fallah, Krafft,
and Wahba 2019; Ceritoglu et al. 2017; Fakih and Ibrahim 2016; Tumen 2016).
However, one commonality can be found in these studies: Syrians not having access
to formal labor market are mostly competing with citizens in the informal sector,
which harbors the most vulnerable strata of society (Del Carpio and Wagner 2015;
Tumen 2016).
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The impact of refugees on objective economic indicators, such as employment and
wage levels, may not be conducive to analyses of whether social discontent is gener-
ated. Instead, subjective indicators, such as the assessments of individual and na-
tional economies, may be associated with the formation of social discontent. Indeed,
research has demonstrated that subjective assessments or relative deprivation among
voters can explain why citizens vote for populist parties, being anti-establishment
in nature (Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018).
Evidence from Uganda has demonstrated that while refugees do not harm the la-
bor market outcomes of the host society, subjective assessments about the impact of
refugees on local economies are highly negative (Kreibaum 2016). For instance, even
though people may not lose their jobs, the labor supply shock due to the presence
of refugees may create a pressure for lower wages, leading wages not to catch up
with inflation rate which might also be exacerbated by the economic strain put by
the refugees. At the end, despite the deterioration of economic situation of hosts,
we might not be able to measure a significant job loss among hosts. Also, employ-
ment status is not associated with negative perceptions against refugees, but the
disadvantageous households’ economic situation is (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014;
Ceyhun 2019). In other words, anti-refugee sentiments may not be concentrated on
those who are objectively worse-off but those who believe that they are worse-off.
Thus, I propose the following set of hypotheses taking both objective and subjective
micro and macro indicators into account:
Hypothesis Ia: Refugee density should decrease the likelihood of being
employed.
Hypothesis Ib: Refugee density should increase the dissatisfaction with
the household financial situation.
Hypothesis Ic: Refugee density should increase the likelihood of neg-
ative perceptions of national economy performance.
However, citizens discontented with the status quo need to direct blame for unfa-
vorable conditions and mismanagement of the economy towards their government.
Research has demonstrated that citizens have a strong tendency to hold their gov-
ernment responsible for the state of the economy (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000).
Considering that refugees create a considerable strain on government’s ability to run
the economy and provide public goods (Maystadt et al. 2019; Francis 2015), it is
imperative to analyze how the presence of refugees is associated with host societies’
evaluations of their government’s performance on managing the economy.
On the other hand, since the competition between refugees and hosts occurs predom-
inantly within the informal sector, the economic situation of the most vulnerable
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people, i.e. poor and uneducated, might be deteriorated, which may augur rising in-
equality. Research has shown that the rise of economic inequality contributes to the
anti-establishment feelings among citizens and the rise of populist parties in Europe
(Rodrik 2017). Similarly, people within authoritarian political arrangements might
be likely to blame their government for the rise of inequality. Thus, I propose the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis IIa: Refugee density should increase host societies’ dissat-
isfaction with government performance on managing economy.
Hypothesis IIb: Refugee density should increase host societies’ dissat-
isfaction with government performance on creating employment.
Hypothesis IIc: Refugee density should increase host societies’ dissat-
isfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality.
Corruption plays a key role in determining whether the perception of economic dete-
rioration turns into anti-establishment feelings (Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga
2013). Public perceptions of structural impediments within the economy and/or
political institutions often forms the catalyst that galvanizes feelings of economic
dissatisfaction into active calls for institutional changes.
Even though the relationship between refugees and corruption within state institu-
tions may not seem obvious, refugees can contribute to the perception of corruption
among host societies for various reasons. First, refugees generate lucrative businesses
based on human trafficking, which in many cases develop corrupt relationships be-
tween criminals and government officials. Second, the cooperation between states
and international organizations in assisting refugees may generate social discontent
among poor citizens who feel marginalized. When international organizations are
perceived as corrupt (Harb and Saab 2014), this may have a spillover effect on gov-
ernmental institutions as well. Lastly, refugees may need to bribe officials to ensure
their security. Research has shown that migrants may commit corrupt activities
if they emigrate from a corrupt home country (Dimant, Krieger, and Redlin 2015).
Given that refugees mostly flee corrupt countries, it is likely that they commit bribes
and other malfunctions in host countries. Even though corrupt activities are not
visible to host societies, it is likely that informal mechanisms or rumors eventually
lead to an increase in the awareness of such activities. Thus, I propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis IId: Refugee density should increase the perception of
corruption in the host society.
It is intuitive to argue that people adopt critical stances against the government in
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case they are dissatisfied with the economic management, even though the exact
causal mechanisms could not be well established (Yang and Holzer 2006; Van de
Walle and Bouckaert 2003). However, whether criticism against the government over
economic management leads to anti-establishment feelings in society is not obvious.
Thus, it is imperative to examine whether anti-establishment feelings nurtured in
society as a result of the blame put on the government.
Literature has adopted abstract methods and proxies to measure anti-establishment
feelings in society. Measures of trust in institutions, in that context, are the most
common ways to understand social grievances against institutions (Mishler and Rose
2001; Hutchison and Johnson 2011). Indeed, it has been documented that lower
political trust induces greater likelihood of voting for anti-establishment parties
(Geurkink et al. 2019). In authoritarian contexts in which people are more likely to
believe their political participation as inconsequential, political distrust is likely to
be a good proxy for anti-establishment feelings.
Moreover, the relationship between corruption and anti-establishment feelings has
been well developed in the literature (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Kostadinova
2012; Mishler and Rose 2001; Seligson 2002). Those who believe that there
is a widespread corruption in state institutions are more likely to nurture anti-
establishment feelings. Also, the evidence from the West suggests that the percep-
tion of corruption is positively correlated with one’s tendency to support populist
parties (Ziller and Schübel 2015; Engler 2016). Thus, I propose the following hy-
pothesis:
Hypothesis III: Refugee density should decrease the confidence in po-
litical institutions.
What is the impact of nurturing anti-establishment feelings in an authoritarian
context on the most preferable governance system? In the West, anti-establishment
feelings have been characterized by a higher likelihood of voting for populist parties
that are authoritarian in nature. Research has indicated that increasingly higher
proportions of youth in the West are in favor of a strong leader unbound to elections
(Foa and Mounk 2017). It may also be reasonable for citizens under authoritarian
contexts to desire such a governance system, i. e. the persistence of their political
systems, so that the restriction towards refugees can be implemented easily and
efficiently.
However, I argue that it is not the case. Public lack of confidence in existing institu-
tions due to the deterioration of their economic situations indicates that people may
now identify the most preferable governance system as something different from the
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status quo. Democracy, in that case, has become appealing to people because of
two reasons. First, people may expect better living conditions from a democratic
system. Evidence from the Middle East has suggested that people conceptualize
democracy based on economic progress (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler, Jamal,
and Robbins 2012; Ceyhun 2017). More specifically, a majority of the population
believes that under a democratic system, the economy runs more efficiently, and
employment opportunities increase dramatically. However, evidence from other re-
gions has demonstrated that such understanding of democracy may not be universal
(Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007).
Second, people may increasingly believe that their voice is not heard by the existing
institutions which fail to bring economic progress. A status quo recalcitrant to
entertain any reform attempts may also lead people to adopt a pro-democratic stance
and desire to have a political system in which they can freely express their opinions.
Thus, I propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis IV: Refugee density should increase the support for democ-
racy in the host society.
I test these hypotheses on an authoritarian country that has been struck with the
refugee populations since its history: Jordan. The recent Syrian shock and the
availability of public opinion data make Jordan a suitable case to discern the extent
that refugees contributed to anti-establishment feelings in host society and the extent
that these public sentiments are motivated by the perceptions of economy and lead
to greater support for democracy.
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3. BACKGROUND ON JORDAN
The land on which modern Jordan was established has always been a destination for
mass migrations throughout the history. Despite the particularly Palestinian nature
of immigration waves to Jordan in the past, people from different nationalities have
started seeking refuge in Jordan recently. To conceptualize, Jordan has experienced
six mass migration waves so far: a mass Circassian exodus after the Circassian War
in 1878, three mass Palestinian exoduses during the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, the
Arab-Israeli war in 1967, and the first Gulf War in 1990, an Iraqi exodus during the
Iraqi Civil War in 2001, and the Syrian exodus during the Syrian Civil War.
Jordan is a constitutional monarchy based on a bicameral system. The King has
the full veto power over the legislative branch, constituting considerable damage
to popular will. Furthermore, the members of the Upper House appointed by the
King overlook the implementation of the constitution. The Lower House, on the
other hand, is formed by national elections. Electoral districts in Jordan have been
tilted to favor Eastern part of country where Transjordanians, traditional supporters
of regime, reside, which as a result hurt the representation of other mass groups in
Jordan like Palestinians. Even though there is a considerable amount of competition
in the elections and the lack of electoral fraud, King’s influence on the formation of
government and capability to veto any law passed by the parliament have resulted
in electoral outcomes that further stabilize the regime (Lust-Okar 2006).
The 1948 Arab-Israeli war brought statehood to Israel but caused about 700,000
Palestinians to be expelled and forcibly displaced from their lands. Jordan was
among a few countries that adopted integrative policies for the Palestinians. It
not only provided full access to social provisions but also granted citizenship to the
Palestinians from the West Bank. This was an exception since most of the host Arab
countries didn’t facilitate the acquisition of citizenship to them. Jordan’s generous
citizenship policy, however, only lasted until the second Palestinian exodus from
Gaza after the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. Thus, the ensuing influx of refugees was
deprived of citizenship rights even though social provisions remained generous.
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Jordan’s first response to the Syrian influx was to open the border crossings with
the consideration of short-term Syrian presence. However, as the Syrian civil war
enters its eighth year, the political landscape indicates no potential for Syrians to
return back to Syria. As of December 2018, Jordan hosts 671,350 Syrians, with
18 percent living in five refugee camps funded by UNHCR and other international
organizations, and the rest spread into Jordan.
Jordan adopted a rather integrative approach to Syrians. Some associated this
approach with Jordan’s strategy to lure international aid (Davis et al. 2017). Syrians
are eligible to receive aid and food vouchers if they are registered to the UNHCR
and access education and healthcare services if they have a service card obtained
from Ministry of Interior. However, those who are not registered by the UNHCR
and not hold service card cannot receive aid and access to welfare services. Those
who hold a service card can enroll their children to public schools and get healthcare
from Ministry of Health facilities with no charge as insured Jordanians until 2014.
In November 2014, Jordan abrogated the free access to healthcare for Syrians. Now,
they are required to pay the same rate as uninsured Jordanians, but it is still better
than foreigners who are required to pay an amount 35%-60% higher than that paid
by uninsured Jordanians (Amnesty International 2016). Overall, it is found that
Syrians tend to cite adequate access to education and healthcare services (REACH
2014; Ceyhun 2017).
As the number of Syrians seeking refuge in Jordan increases, the burden on the
economy and the infrastructure, already deteriorating before the crisis, was exacer-
bated. Even though these economic and infrastructural problems are deeply linked
to structural and natural factors, Syrians were blamed by the host society as the
sole reason (Francis 2015). More specifically, public frustration against Syrians stem
from a number of factors, such as overcrowded education and health facilities; the
increased demand by Syrians for housing boosting the rent prices; Syrians’ burden
on the labor market and the infrastructure, especially on waste management and
water supply.
In 2016, Jordan declared to issue 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees. Even
though there are concerns about the applicability of this new policy (Lenner and
Turner 2019), close to 130,000 work permits have been issued by 2019 (Ministry of
Labor 2019), which constitutes 30 percent of the working-age population of Syrians
in Jordan according to the UNHCR estimates. After this law Syrians have become
eligible to register in the formal sector and have started competing with Jordanians
who are working at the formal level. On the other hand, even though it has been
demonstrated that Syrian refugees compete with other non-Jordanian groups at the
11
informal sector (Malaeb and Wahba 2018), the subjective assessments of Jordanians
may deviate from this reality.
Protests movements in Jordan have been mostly motivated by economic concerns
(Al-Ajlouni and Hartnett 2019). Thousands took to the street to protest economic
mismanagement of government after the Iraqi exodus. Indeed, the lack of economic
prosperity was put at the center of the protests during the Arab Spring. Also, social
discontent against Syrians contributed to the general public frustration against the
government (Francis 2015) which failed to carry out the structural reforms it had
promised during the Arab Uprisings (Yom 2013).
Macroeconomic indicators suggest that since the outset of the Syrian influx, Jordan’s
economy has deteriorated considerably. In 2018, youth unemployment peaked at 40
percent, and economic growth has slowed down. Even though Syrians were blamed
as the scapegoats for the economic deterioration, Jordanians have also developed
grievances against the government. 2018 protests were telling; Jordanians took to
streets in thousands to protest IMF-backed tax reforms, which resulted in the disso-
lution of the Hani al-Mulki government. In short, the centrality of economic issues
to Jordanian politics provides a suitable case in which above-established theory can
be tested.
12
4. METHODOLOGY
To test this theory, I combined the data taken fromWorld Value Survey Wave IV- VI
and Arab Barometer II-V, nationally representative datasets that cover a time period
between 2001-2018. More specifically, the merged data covers the following time
periods for pre-Syrian shock (2011): 2001, 2007 and 2010, and the following time
periods for post-Syrian shock: 2012, 2016, 2018. However, it should be noted that
not all outcomes of interest are asked consistently throughout waves. As a result,
for some variables, such as employment, it is possible to make analysis covering a
longer period, but for some variables, such as government performances, it is not
possible.
4.1 Identification Strategy
The identification of refugees is crucial since differential identifications can gener-
ate fundamentally different results. Even though there are several accounts about
the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan (Krafft et al. 2019), I use the number of
registered Syrians taken from the UNHCR for various reasons. First, only the UN-
HCR shares the number of Syrian refugees on an annual basis. Other resources,
such as the Jordan census of 2015, present the number for only one year. Given
that the public opinion data includes more than one time points after the refugee
shock, UNHCR data is the most suitable data publicly available. Second, Jordan
was criticized for inflating the number of refugees, which decreases the credibility of
the data shared by the government of Jordan (Lenner 2016). Third, UNHCR shares
the regional distribution of Syrians based on gender and age categories, which signif-
icantly improves the power of identification. However, I test the extent to which my
results are compatible with different identification strategies as robustness checks.
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Figure 4.1 demonstrates that the Syrian refugees in Jordan skyrocketed in 2013, and
after 2014 the number of refugees have become steeper.
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Figure 4.1 Number of Syrian Refugees Registered in Jordan
Considering that only 7 percent of female Syrians enter into the Jordanian labor
market (Stave and Hillesund 2015), I take the number of male Syrians aged between
18-59, the most likely group that competes with Jordanians in the labor market.
This is an important improvement for the existing research that assumes gender and
age distributions similar across regions by utilizing the density of Syrian refugees
without gender difference. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of the density of Syrian
male refugees aged between 18-59.
Figure 4.2 Distribution of Syrian refugees in Jordan
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4.2 Estimation Strategy
The main method to estimate the impact of Syrian refugees is the linear difference-
in-difference. This method analyzes group-wise (here, region) and time-invariant
differences between treated and control groups by using fixed-effects (Angrist and
Pischke 2008). Its main assumption is the parallel trends between treated and
control groups, that is, if the shock had not been realized, the trends within groups,
as well as their difference, would have been preserved. Measuring the deviations
from these different characteristics due to an exogenous shock, this method extract
causality between Syrian refugees and outcomes of interest.
A concern may be related to latent characteristics that may influence the outcomes of
interest. For instance, literature has discussed that citizens’ values and expectations
are crucial in explaining whether government performances lead to lower levels of
political trust (van der Meer and Hakhverdian 2017). However, the research design
proposed in here eliminates such concerns by assuming that these values are not
time-variant at the regional level. Even though such settings can be constructed
without control variables, I include standard demographic controls to decrease the
statistical noise in the data. The proposed weighted regression analysis is;
Dijt = α+βMaleDensjt+γj + δt+κkt+Xit+ ijt
where i indexes individual, j indexes 12 governorates in Jordan, t indexes time pe-
riod, and k indexes three big regions consisting of North, Center and South regions
whose boundaries are determined by the range of mountains in Jordan. Dijt rep-
resents the outcome of interest. MaleDensjt is the density of Syrian male refugees
aged between 18-59. This specification operationalizes a continuous treatment inten-
sity without differentiating between treatment and control groups. Having the same
statistical philosophy, this method provides flexibility to the analysis. However, I
also conducted the same analysis with treatment and control groups. γj is region-
and δt is year-fixed effects. To loose the common trend assumption, I added 3-bigger
region and year-fixed effects κkt. Such specification is similar to the one used by
Stephens and Yang (2014). Standard demographic controls (Xit) include continu-
ous age, four education levels, and gender. The education categories are illiterate
or literate with no diploma, primary school graduates, high school and university
graduates. Also, I use the weights provided by the World Values Survey and the
Arab Barometer. This equation is a standard linear difference-in-difference setting.
15
I am mainly interested in β.
Since Syrians are not exogenously distributed across Jordan, my estimates may suffer
from endogeneity bias. Thus, I operationalize an instrumental variable to predict
Syrian density as follows;
IVjt =
MaleDens2004j×Rt
Distancej
MaleDens2004j is the density of non-Jordanians, mostly Egyptians and Syrians,
given in 2004 census. Rt is the total number of refugees in Jordan in year t.
Distancej is the closest bird distance between governorate j and the Syrian border.
Main assumption of this instrument is that Syrians fleeing from Syria are likely to
move to the places where Syrians have already been present, while accounting for the
cost of moving to farther places by having the closes bird distance between gover-
norate j and the Syrian border as the denominator. This instrument has similarities
with the instruments used by Altindag and Kaushal (2017) and Fallah, Krafft, and
Wahba (2019)1.
Dependent variables are operationalized as follows. One question asked whether a
respondent is employed with 1 representing that the respondent is employed and
0 otherwise. Respondents were also asked to evaluate their economic situation.
Since the scaling of this question is different between World Values Survey and
Arab Barometer, I created a binary measure with 1 indicating that a respondent
evaluates his/her economic situation as being better than the standardized mean
value of the 2001 sample. The main idea behind this rescaling is to understand the
deviations from household economic situations in 2001. To measure respondents’
evaluations of national economic situation, respondents were asked the following
question: "How would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country?",
with 4 indicating respondents evaluate their national economic situations as very
good and 1 as being very bad.
To measure the perception of the government performances in managing the econ-
omy, I used the questions asking respondents’ appreciation of government in a) cre-
ating employment opportunities; b) managing the economy and c) narrowing gap
between rich and poor. All questions are Likert-scale questions with 4 categories
and higher values presenting greater appreciation of government performances cited
by Jordanians. For the perception of corruption, I use the question asking whether
1Altindag and Kaushal (2017) uses the distribution of Arabic speaking people in Turkey in 1965 to predict
the Syrian density in Turkey, but the statistical association between their instrument and density variable
disappears when the distance is controlled for (Aksu, Erzan, and Kırdar 2018).On the other hand, Fallah,
Krafft, and Wahba (2019) uses the density of non-Jordanians in 2004 to predict Syrian density in Jordan.
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a respondent thinks there is corruption at state institutions, with 1 being that re-
spondent believe the existence of corruption and 0 otherwise.
To measure political confidence in institutions, I created an additive index of trust
in government, parliament, political parties and legal system. Such indexes are
widely used for both within- and cross-country analyses (Chang and Chu 2006;
Hutchison and Johnson 2011; Stoyan et al. 2016; Clausen, Kraay, and Nyiri 2011;
Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012), even though they may be problematic to make
cross-country comparisons (Schneider 2017). To measure the level of support for
democracy, respondents were asked to evaluate democratic systems. I recoded these
variables in a way that higher values mean higher support for democracy. Table 4.1
shows the variables, the recoding procedure and the years when the variables were
asked.
Table 4.1 Variables Operationalized
Name of the Variable Recoding Procedure Years Asked
Employment 1:Employed, 0:Otherwise 2001, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Eva. of National Economy 1:Very Bad - 4:Very Good 2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Eva. of Household Economy 1: Higher than the standardized mean value of the 2001 sample, 0: otherwise 2001, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Gov. Per. on Managing Economy 1:Very Bad - 4:Very Good 2010, 2016
Gov. Per. on Creating Employment 1:Very Bad - 4:Very Good 2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Gov. Per. on Decreasing Inequality 1:Very Bad - 4:Very Good 2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Perception of Corruption 1: Yes, 0: No 2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Confidence in Political Institutions Higher values demostrate higher trust 2007, 2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Evaluation of Democracy 1:Very Bad - 4:Very Good 2001, 2007, 2010, 2012
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5. RESULTS
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
In this section, I present the descriptive statistics of the variables operationalized.
Table 5.1 shows that among control variables, the respondents surveyed after the
arrival of Syrian refugees are older than the respondents surveyed before the arrival
of Syrian refugees. Furthermore, there are significant mean-differences between the
variables of interests before and after the influx of Syrian refugees in the sense of
supporting the hypotheses established above.
The mean values of a) being employed; b) evaluating national economy better; c)
evaluating household economy better; d) appreciating the government in managing
economy; e) in creating employment; f) in decreasing inequality; and h) the con-
fidence in political institutions was higher among the respondents surveyed before
the influx of Syrian refugees. Also, perception of corruption is lower in this group.
Notably, the mean values of support for democracy among the respondents after the
influx of Syrian refugees is significantly lower. However, it is imperative to adopt
more advanced statistical tools to understand the extent to which the changes in
the mean values are associated with Syrians.
5.2 Estimation Results
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Before Shock
(T0 < 2012)
After Shock
(T1 ≥ 2012) Difference
Mean SD Mean SD T0−T1 T-Statistics
Education 2.81 0.88 2.79 0.84 0.02 (0.96)
Age 37.20 14.09 40.76 14.96 -3.56*** (-11.59)
Gender 1.51 0.50 1.50 0.50 0.01 (0.51)
Employment 0.37 0.48 0.30 0.46 0.07*** (6.81)
Eva. of National Economy 2.23 0.86 2.09 0.87 0.14*** (5.00)
Eva. of Household Economy 0.41 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.13*** (13.15)
Gov. Per. in Managing Economy 2.64 0.79 2.41 0.86 0.23*** (6.76)
Gov. Per. in Employment 2.25 0.83 1.82 0.87 0.43*** (16.01)
Gov. Per. in Decreasing Inequality 2.21 0.85 1.81 0.82 0.40*** (14.49)
Perception of Corruption 0.74 0.44 0.88 0.33 -0.14*** (-9.74)
Confidence in Political Institutions 12.59 2.84 10.21 2.63 2.39*** (31.22)
Support for Democracy 3.47 0.65 3.35 0.71 0.12*** (5.60)
Observations 3611 5695 9306
Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 5.2 presents the difference-in-difference (Upper Panel) and instrumental vari-
able results (Lower Panel). Considering the high levels of gender segregation in
Jordanian labor market, I test Hypothesis Ia for males and females independently,
a common approach in the literature (Aksu, Erzan, and Kırdar 2018; Aydemir and
Kırdar 2017;Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba 2019). First column under Hypothesis Ia
shows the results for male respondents, and second column shows the female re-
spondents. The other results have gender as a control variable.
Difference-in-difference results demonstrate that Syrian have decreased the likeli-
hood of male Jordanians being employed, while there is no significant association
between female Jordanians and Syrian density. This impact of Syrians on the labor
market differs from previous research that has found no deterioration of Jordnaians’
labor market outcomes as a result the influx of Syrian refugees (Fallah, Krafft, and
Wahba 2019). The differences between these results and those presented by Fallah,
Krafft, and Wahba (2019) can be related to various reasons. First, they use the
number of Syrians taken from Jordan’s 2015 census, whereas I use the numbers
stated by the UNHCR. Second, they use density of Syrian refugees by assuming
that gender and age distributions among regions are similar, but I use male Syrians
of ages 18-59. Lastly, they conduct their analysis by using Jordan Labor Market
Panel Survey. Even though a detailed analysis of the impact of Syrian refugees on
Jordanian labor market outcomes is far beyond the scope of this research, Table 5.2
demonstrates that Syrians have decreased the employment levels of male Jordanians.
Also, the results indicate that the subjective assessments of economic conditions
among Jordanians have deteriorated after the influx of Syrian refugees. More specif-
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ically, Jordanians have become less likely to evaluate their household and national
economic situations favorably. This impact of the refugees on the perceptions about
the state of economy is also compatible with (Kreibaum 2016), demonstrating that
the perceptions of host societies about the performance of national and household
economies have been negatively influenced by the influx of refugees.
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Furthermore, Syrian refugees are not the only one Jordanians put the blame on: Jor-
danians increasingly are dissatisfied with the government performance on running
the economy. Table 5.2 demonstrates that the influx of Syrian refugees systemat-
ically decreased the likelihood of Jordanians appreciating their government in a)
managing economy; b) creating employment opportunities; and c) decreasing in-
equality in society. Also, perception of corruption has deteriorated as a result of
the influx of Syrians even though detecting the exact mechanism leading to this
impact is far beyond the scope of this research. In short, these results support the
first and second sets of hypotheses arguing that Syrians have negatively influenced
the prospects of Jordanians in the labor market as well as their perception about
national and household economies for which Jordanians also hold their government
responsible.
Hypothesis III was testing whether the Syrian refuges decreased the confidence in
political institutions, proxying the extent of anti-establishment feelings among Jor-
danians. Table 5.2 demonstrates that Syrian refugees decreased the extent of con-
fidence in the institutions, suggesting that Syrian refugees have indeed contributed
to the anti-establishment feelings of Jordanians.
As predicted, these anti-establishment feelings among Jordanians turn into greater
levels of support for democracy. The last columns in the upper panel of Table 5.2
maintain that Syrian refugees increased the support for democracy among Jordani-
ans These results indicate that Syrian refugees contributed to the anti-establishment
feelings among Jordanians by motivating economic mechanisms. In short, the results
presented in Table 3 demonstrate that the political impact of Syrian refugees oper-
ates in a much deeper level: Syrian refugees can change how Jordanians want to be
governed and increase the likelihood of Jordanians being supportive of democracy.
However, due to the fact that Syrian refugees are not exogenously distributed across
the governorates, difference-in-difference results may suffer from endogeneity bias.
Thus, I conducted the same analysis with an IV that predicts the density of Syrian
refugees in a given governorate of Jordan. Lower panel of Table 5.2 shows the IV
results. All results are compatible with the difference-in-difference estimations and
show that there is indeed a causal relation between Syrian refugees and the way
Jordanians nurture anti-establishment feelings and become more likely to support
democracy. However, a caveat must be given: even though the estimation strategy
relaxes the parallel trends assumptions across the governorates, parallel trends need
to be examined to provide more credible results. In the next section, I test the
hypotheses with treatment and control groups and show that the parallel trend
assumption hold for the variables available in the past data.
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5.3 Results with Control and Treatment Groups
As mentioned earlier, Difference-in-Difference estimates can also be analyzed
through control and treatment groups. Even though Syrian densities across the
governorates are close to each other, Mafraq, the governorate bordering to Syria,
has exceptionally higher Syrian refugee density with 10 percent, followed by 3 per-
cent in Amman in 2016. The other regions follows Amman within 1-3 percent range.
Furthermore, the order having the highest Syrian density for Mafraq has not changed
in time. Thus, Mafraq can be chosen as a treatment region.
To estimate the impact of Syrian refugees, the following equation is utilized;
Dijt = α+βPostit×Treatmentij +γj + δt+κkt+Xit+ ij
where i indexes individual, and j indexes 12 governorates in Jordan. Dij represents
the outcome of interest. Postit is the dichotomous indicator taking the value 1 for
the time period after the Syrian influx and 0 otherwise, and Treatmentij is taking
the value 1 for the governorate Mafraq and 0 otherwise. γj is region- and δt is year-
fixed effects. Similar to the above estimation, to relax parallel trend assumption, I
added 3-bigger region and year-fixed effects κij . Again, individual-control variables
(Xit) include age, four education levels, and gender variables. I am mainly interested
in β.
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Table 5.3 shows the results with treatment status. The results are compatible with
Table 5.2, demonstrating that Syrian refugees have negatively influenced Jordanians’
labor market outcomes and perceptions about economy, leading Jordanians to have
become less likely to cite confidence in state institutions. The anti-establishment
attitudes have generated greater support for democracy among Jordanians.
Even though my estimation controls for differential trends to some extent by adding
the interaction of bigger-region and year effects, it is still imperative to analyze the
trends between control and treatment regions. However, only four out of nine in-
dicators go back in time, enabling to visualize the trends between treatment and
control groups. These four variables are employment, evaluation of household eco-
nomic situations, confidence in political institutions, and support for democracy.
For the other variables, the date goes back to 2010 when the Arab Barometer Wave
II was conducted, not permitting to check if the parallel trend assumptions hold.
Thus, for the other variables my results claim causality under the assumption that
including bigger region and year interaction controls for differential trends between
treated and control groups.
.5
5
.6
.6
5
.7
.7
5
.8
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
year
Treatment Control
Male Employment
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
year
Treatment Control
Female Employment
.4
.4
5
.5
.5
5
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
year
Treatment Control
Evaluation of Household Economies
9
9.
5
10
10
.5
11
2007 2008 2009 2010
year
Treatment Control
Confidence in Institutions
3.
1
3.
2
3.
3
3.
4
3.
5
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
year
Treatment Control
Support for Democracy
Figure 5.1 Parallel Trends
Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the trends for the variables that we can track by
using past data. Even though the trends for evaluation of household economies and
support for democracy do not move in parallel, this movement would not hurt the
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sign of my estimations. More specifically, if the Syrian shock had not been realized,
the expected coefficient for the evaluation of household economies would have been
positive due to the upward trend in the treatment group. Thus, the estimated
negative coefficient might be an underestimated value offset by the upward trend
in the treatment group to some extent. This suggests that the impact of Syrians
is likely to be more severe on the evaluations of Jordanians about their household
economic situation than what the Table 4 indicates.
Similarly, the downward trend of support for democracy in the treatment group
suggest that if the Syrian shock has not been realized the coefficient of the support
for democracy would have been negative. Thus, the estimated positive value in
Hypothesis IV might be an underestimated value offset by the downward trend
in the treatment group to some extent. More specifically, the impact of Syrians
on Jordanians’ support for democracy might be stronger than what the Table 5.3
suggests. I provide mathematical proofs for these claims in the Appendix.
In short, Figure 5.1 indicates that for these five variables for which the parallel trend
analysis can be made, the coefficients, if not representing the true value, have correct
signs, thus increasing the credence over the proposed causal mechanism.
5.4 Causal Mediation Analysis
To what extent is the relationship between Syrian refugees and support for democ-
racy mediated by the proposed mechanism? Or more generally do we observe a
statistical relationship as stated in Figure 1? In this section, I analyzed the extent
to which results are mediated by the proposed mechanism.1. However, one caveat
needs to be given: since political trust in institutions are not asked in 2012, the only
post-treatment year for the support of democracy variable, I can not analyze the
extent to which the relationship between Syrian refugees and support for democracy
is mediated by the anti-establishment feelings of Jordanians.
1This method basically tries to understand the extent to which the coefficient of an independent variable
of interest is changing when adding the mediator as another control. Causal Mediation Analysis help
understand the relationship between three types of effects:Total effect, natural indirect effect and controlled
direct effect. Total effect can be described as the effect of an independent variable when the mediator is
not added, and natural indirect effect represents the effect explained by the mediator. Controlled direct
effect is the remaining effect of the independent variable not explained by the mediator.
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Table 5.4 Causal Mediation Analysis: Government Performances
Government Performance on Managing Economy
Employment Eva. of Nat. Econ. Eva. of Hous. Econ.
Controlled Direct Effect -.1271882 -.0781292 -.1213719
Natural Indirect Effect -.0000683 -.0199988 -.0038215
Total Effect -.1272566 -.098128 -.1251933
Perc. Explained 0.00 0.20 0.03
Government Performance on Decreasing Inequality
Employment Eva. of Nat. Econ. Eva. of Hous. Econ.
Controlled Direct Effect -.0612819 -.0411579 -.0667284
Natural Indirect Effect -.0007603 -.0179582 -.0030193
Total Effect -.0620422 -.0591161 -.0697478
Perc. Explained 0.01 0.30 0.04
Government Performance on Decreasing Inequality
Employment Eva. of Nat. Econ. Eva. of Hous. Econ.
Controlled Direct Effect -.0861197 -.0663283 -.117367
Natural Indirect Effect -.0004223 -.0167214 -.0024005
Total Effect -.086542 -.0830497 -.1197675
Perc. Explained 0.00 0.20 0.02
Government Performance on Managing Economy
Employment Eva. of Nat. Econ. Eva. of Hous. Econ.
Controlled Direct Effect .0361111 .0432605 .0431632
Natural Indirect Effect .0000715 .0042955 .0000469
Total Effect .0360396 .0475561 .0432101
Perc. Explained 0.00 0.09 0.00
Notes: Natural indirect effect demonstrates the effect of Syrian refugees mediated by the outcome of interest.
Difference-in-Difference is applied without instrumenting the density variable.
Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 demonstrate the results for causal mediation analysis. As
shown in Table 5.4, Jordanians are likely to evaluate their goverment performance on
managing economy, creating employment, and decreasing inequality based on their
evaluation of national economy. By contrast, the link between Syrian refugees and
government performances is mediated by evaluation of household economic situation
to some extent and not mediated by employment.
On the other hand, Table 5.5 demonstrates that Syrian refugees have led to anti-
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establishment feelings in society, mediated by Jordanians’ evaluation of government
performances and perception of corruption at state institutions. Notably, satisfac-
tion with government performance on managing economy and decreasing inequality
can explain the link between Syrian refugees and anti-establishment feelings with
62 percent of and 69 percent of the total effect explained by these variables, re-
spectively. Overall, causal mediation analysis provides suggestive evidence for the
proposed mechanism given in Figure 2.1.
Table 5.5 Causal Mediation Analysis: Government Performances
Anti-Establishment Feelings
Gov. Per. on
Man. Economy
Gov. Per. on
Creat. Employment
Gov. Per. on
Decr. Inequality
Corruption
Controlled Direct Effect -.1045388 -.0851873 -.0377496 -.1564344
Natural Indirect Effect -.1703881 -.0599969 -.0843623 -.0283917
Total Effect -.2749269 -.1451842 -.1221119 -.1848261
Perc. Explained 0.62 0.41 0.69 0.15
Notes: Natural indirect effect demonstrates the effect of Syrian refugees mediated by the outcome of interest.
Difference-in-Difference is applied without instrumenting the density variable.
5.5 Subgroup analyses
Considering that Syrian refugees mostly compete with male Jordanians in the labor
market, there may exist differences between males and females about the extent to
which the proposed mechanism is valid. Table A1 and Table A2 in Appendix shows
the results for female and male samples. Even though the intermediary mechanisms,
i.e. the extent of the perception about economic situation and the blame put on the
Jordanian government are similar across gender groups, the coefficient of support
for democracy decreases to some extent for the female respondents. By comparison,
the questions measuring support for democracy are statistically significant among
male respondents, suggesting that the proposed mechanism is stronger among the
male Jordanians, who are the ones competing with Syrians in the labor market.
Table A3 to Table A8 in Appendix demonstrates the results with different age cat-
egories. Notably, even though all age categories with the exception of those older
than 65 years old have become more likely to support democracy, the economic con-
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siderations of Jordanians are concentrated on those ages 24 to 54, which corresponds
to the proportion of Jordanian most likely to be active in the labor market. For the
other age groups, that is, those with ages 18-24 and older than 55 years old, other
intermediary mechanisms may be effective, such as cultural or social.
Notably, the deterioration of employment prospects among those Jordanians who are
illiterate or literate with no diploma has not triggered the proposed mechanism as
demonstrated in Table A9. This result suggests that objective assessments may not
be sufficient to lead anti-establishment feelings and support for democracy. Table
A10 to Table A12 demonstrate that the other education groups have become more
likely to support democracy, but the proposed mechanism seems to be strongest
among those with primary education and high school diploma. Given that Syrians
in Jordan are mostly uneducated (Stave and Hillesund 2015), these education groups
are more likely to compete with unskilled Syrians in the labor market. In short,
the examination of subgroups indicates that the impact of Syrian settlements is
strongest among those groups most likely to compete with Syrians in the labor
market, providing a further evidence for the proposed causal mechanism.
5.6 Robustness Checks
Identification strategy is crucial in discerning the impact of Syrians on public opin-
ion. Indeed, different identification strategies may result in completely different
results. To analyze the extent to which my results are robust to different identifica-
tion strategies, I rerun the regressions by adopting different strategies. First, I did
the same analysis with the Syrian density including all age and gender categories,
taken from the UNHCR. Table A13 demonstrates that the results are compatible
with my results. It should be noted that for the instrumental variable results I use
the density of non-Jordanians in 2004 Census including all age and gender categories,
a logical correction.
Second, I use the data taken from the Jordan 2015 census, which was used by Fallah,
Krafft, and Wahba (2019). Since this specification gives the distribution of Syrians
for only 2015, I first run the regressions by only including the respective years, that
is, the years that is closest to 2015. Since support for democracy is not asked in
2016, I take the numbers for 2012. Table A14 demonstrates that the results with
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this identification are compatible with my results.
Also, I did the same analysis by including all years. This specification adds one
more assumption to the assumptions of similar gender and age distributions across
governorates: the distribution of Syrians across the governorates are similar across
all years. Even though this is a strong assumption, I believe it can hold considering
that Syrians have always been more populated in the bordering regions and the
capital. Table A14 shows that the results are compatible with my results.
Lastly, if the regions hit by refugees happen to be places mostly influenced by the
democratic discourse created during the Arab Uprisings, my estimates might have
captured the impact of Arab Uprisings rather than that of refugee settlements. Even
though this confounding cannot be directly tested, I tried to capture the impact of
the Arab Uprisings by re-estimating my coefficients with a control that measures
the mean value of self-cited interest in politics at the regional level.2 The main
assumption in this specification is that the regions with higher levels of interest
in politics are more likely to be influenced by the democratic discourse created
during the Arab Uprisings. Thus, adding this control eliminates the impact of Arab
Uprisings to some extent. Table A15 demonstrates that adding this control does
not significantly change my estimations.
2The results do not significantly change when I add self-cited interest in politics at the individual level.
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6. CONCLUSION
The massive migration in the West may have led to the rise of populist parties and
leaders. The populist discourse fueling intolerance and authoritarian attitudes into
the Western societies have led academics and Western media to mistakenly suppose
an indirect link between Syrian refugees and authoritarian attitudes in society. The
core aim of this research is to caution that any claim about the threat of migration to
democratic sentiments in society needs to be conditional on democratic institutions.
More specifically, under authoritarian contexts migration may become a catalyst to
galvanize democratic sentiments.
In this thesis, I develop a theory that maintains that the presence of refugees might
be associated with anti-establishment values among host societies living authoritar-
ian institutions as it often occurs in Western contexts. However, I demonstrate that
the anti-establishment feelings have led hosts to become more supportive of democ-
racy and less supportive of authoritarian leaders. Considering the importance of
economic well-being in the sustenance of authoritarian ruling, I propose a chain of
reaction between refugees and anti-establishment feelings, motivated by economic
mechanisms.
I test this theory on an authoritarian country that is struct by the massive of Syrian
refugees: Jordan. Using the Syrian refugee shock as a natural experiment, I establish
a causal mechanism between the presence of Syrians and various outcomes of interest
raised by the theory developed in this article. My estimates demonstrated that
Syrian refugees have led Jordanians to become more skeptic towards national and
their households’ economic well-being. Moreover, male Jordanians appear to suffer
from Syrians in the labor market: they became less likely to be employed. Also, my
results indicate that Jordanians have become more likely to criticize the government
in running the economy and providing economic prosperity. As a result, Jordanians
have become less likely to cite trust in governmental institutions, demonstrating the
increase in anti-establishment feelings in society.
I propose two reasons why people under authoritarian institutions may become
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more likely to support democracy when they are dissatisfied with the existing in-
stitutions. First, people may conceptualize democracy based on economic terms.
Indeed, research on the Middle East demonstrates that citizens associate democ-
racy with economic prosperity (Jamal and Tessler 2008;Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins
2012;Ceyhun 2017). Second, the tendency of authoritarian institutions not to initi-
ate reforms may have led people to desire a governance system in which they can
voice their demands for reform. Even though the exact psychological mechanism
in becoming more supportive of democracy once being disassociated with the au-
thoritarian institutions should be further explored in future research, I find that
Jordanians have become more likely to support a democratic governance as a result
of the presence of Syrians.
To what extent the result of this thesis can be generalized into other contexts?
Given that the sustenance of authoritarian ruling depends on economic well-being,
I believe the results of this research can be extended to other contexts as well. Even
though economic mechanisms provide a solid and generalizable account as to the
creation of pro-democratic sentiments, domestic variables need to be considered. For
instance, people need to be fed enough to start thinking about their most preferred
governance system once they perceive that refugees influence the economy badly.
In an authoritarian country in which people live at the edge of starvation line, it
would be mistaken to assume that this theory holds. Thus, further research needs
to examine other authoritarian contexts hit by refugee inflows, such as Uganda.
This thesis significantly contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the im-
pact of Syrian refugees on public opinion may operate in a much deeper level: the
refugees may initiate a chain of reaction resulting in hosts becoming more likely
to support democracy. Methodologically, it adopts causal methods from labor eco-
nomics literature that can be further practiced by political scientists. Also, this
research demonstrates the importance of institutions in determining the impact of
the refugees on political attributes by studying a non-Western and authoritarian
context.
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APPENDIX A
Mathematical Proofs
In this section, I will show that the violation of parallel trend assumptions for
evaluation of national economies and support for democracy do not hurt the sign of
the causal impact given in Table 4.
The estimated negative value for evaluation of national
economies in Table 4 is an overestimated value.
Proof. Under the conditional independence assumption and without refugee shock,
the outcome variable (here, the evaluation of household economies) evolves according
to two different time trends, that is, for the treatment group we have;
E[Y0igt|i,g, t] = γg +λtA
where i represents individual controls, g group controls and t time controls. γg is
the time-invariant group characteristics and λtA is the time effect. Notex that tA
represents the time before the shock. For the control group, denote;
E[Y ′0igt|i,g, t] = γ′g +λ′tA
Note that outcome variables with scripts represent the control groups. Note that
after the shock, we have;
E[Y1igt|i,g, t] = γg +λtB + θ
where θ represents the causal impact of Syrians on outcome variable of interest and
tB represents the time after the shock. For the control group, we have;
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E[Y ′1igt|i,g, t] = γ′g +λ′tB
Notice that since the slope of trend for the evaluation of national economic situation
is larger for the treatment group, we have λtB−λtA>λ′tB−λ′tA . The regression device
operationalized linearly approximates the following calculation;
∆−∆′ = (λtB −λtA) + θ− (λ′tB −λ′tA)≈ β < 0
where ∆ represents the change of outcome variable before and after the refugee
shock, that is, E[Y1igt|i,g, t]−E[Y0igt|i,g, t], and β is the coefficient of the evaluation
of household economies given in Table 4. Since λtB −λtA>λ′tB −λ′tA and β < 0, we
have θ < 0 and θ < β < 0. This suggests that the causal impact of Syrian refugees
on the evaluation of household economies (θ) is negative and more severe than what
Table 4 suggests (β).
The estimated positive value for support for democracy in Ta-
ble 4 is an underestimated value.
Proof. This claim also holds true since ∆−∆′ ≈ β > 0 and λtB −λtA<λ′tB −λ′tA ,
we have θ > 0, and θ > β > 0.
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Results with Gender Categories
Table A.1 Results for Female Sample
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.005 -0.025+ -0.124*** -0.191*** -0.077 -0.095* 0.056*** -0.069 0.133*
(0.012) (0.014) (0.028) (0.026) (0.046) (0.036) (0.010) (0.043) (0.057)
Observations 4655 4633 3414 1156 3215 3182 3068 2682 2422
R2 0.130 0.103 0.106 0.096 0.159 0.123 0.062 0.177 0.063
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.003 -0.020 -0.128*** -0.146*** -0.118+ -0.086* 0.069*** -0.040 0.080
(0.014) (0.016) (0.037) (0.032) (0.068) (0.043) (0.011) (0.042) (0.054)
Observations 4655 4633 3414 1156 3215 3182 3068 2682 2422
R2 0.130 0.103 0.106 0.096 0.158 0.123 0.062 0.177 0.062
F 90.418 91.394 31.466 52.686 30.231 30.925 32.068 103.456 87.038
Results with Treatment Status
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Post X Treatment -0.045 -0.117+ -0.638*** -0.707*** -0.135 -0.371** 0.269*** -0.255 0.159+
(0.059) (0.060) (0.054) (0.098) (0.181) (0.134) (0.036) (0.177) (0.093)
Observations 4655 4633 3414 1156 3215 3182 3068 2682 2422
R2 0.130 0.103 0.107 0.093 0.158 0.123 0.062 0.177 0.061
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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Table A.2 Results for Male Sample
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.023* -0.027** -0.010 -0.064** -0.060 -0.117*** 0.036** -0.178*** 0.288***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.038) (0.019) (0.039) (0.029) (0.011) (0.038) (0.058)
Observations 4623 4600 3430 1167 3239 3220 3160 2873 2533
R2 0.088 0.096 0.104 0.047 0.117 0.084 0.047 0.185 0.079
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.031* -0.026* 0.000 -0.041+ -0.052 -0.124*** 0.012 -0.180*** 0.246***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.050) (0.022) (0.044) (0.034) (0.015) (0.042) (0.053)
Observations 4623 4600 3430 1167 3239 3220 3160 2873 2533
R2 0.088 0.096 0.104 0.047 0.117 0.084 0.046 0.185 0.079
F 93.083 93.468 30.569 52.652 30.781 30.367 29.480 111.109 61.637
Results with Treatment Status
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Post X Treatment -0.102* -0.140*** -0.274*** -0.185** -0.380** -0.488*** 0.110** -0.791*** 0.526***
(0.039) (0.027) (0.076) (0.061) (0.116) (0.097) (0.033) (0.135) (0.094)
Observations 4623 4600 3430 1167 3239 3220 3160 2873 2533
R2 0.088 0.096 0.105 0.046 0.118 0.084 0.046 0.185 0.076
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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Results with Age Categories
Table A.3 Regression Results for those ages 18-24
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.026 0.039*** -0.020 0.019 -0.064* -0.077 -0.014 0.003 -0.040 0.245**
(0.025) (0.010) (0.018) (0.042) (0.028) (0.048) (0.029) (0.019) (0.085) (0.078)
Observations 920 713 1624 1082 351 1030 1026 985 892 1002
R2 0.192 0.086 0.122 0.161 0.074 0.157 0.119 0.065 0.227 0.101
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.063+ 0.054*** 0.001 0.002 -0.031 -0.138*** -0.029 -0.017 -0.049 0.276**
(0.034) (0.011) (0.023) (0.047) (0.039) (0.034) (0.033) (0.028) (0.093) (0.089)
Observations 920 713 1624 1082 351 1030 1026 985 892 1002
R2 0.191 0.085 0.122 0.160 0.074 0.157 0.119 0.064 0.227 0.101
F 149.103 56.706 93.359 30.360 37.951 27.718 29.135 29.245 89.735 98.389
Results with Treatment Status
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Post X Treatment -0.060 0.134** -0.123 -0.096 -0.316*** -0.537*** -0.027 0.049 0.162 0.430**
(0.095) (0.049) (0.082) (0.109) (0.071) (0.108) (0.079) (0.048) (0.402) (0.156)
Observations 920 713 1624 1082 351 1030 1026 985 892 1002
R2 0.191 0.084 0.123 0.161 0.074 0.158 0.119 0.065 0.227 0.099
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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Table A.4 Regression Results for those ages 25-34
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.053+ -0.041 -0.027 -0.079* -0.341*** -0.073+ -0.168*** 0.055*** -0.245*** 0.163*
(0.027) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.046) (0.039) (0.036) (0.012) (0.056) (0.070)
Observations 1045 1264 2295 1599 587 1493 1479 1447 1297 1370
R2 0.114 0.198 0.088 0.127 0.098 0.187 0.130 0.074 0.205 0.056
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.024 -0.048+ -0.014 -0.109** -0.290*** -0.062 -0.183*** 0.062*** -0.221*** 0.101
(0.032) (0.027) (0.034) (0.034) (0.045) (0.043) (0.046) (0.015) (0.062) (0.069)
Observations 1045 1264 2295 1599 587 1493 1479 1447 1297 1370
R2 0.113 0.198 0.088 0.127 0.097 0.187 0.130 0.074 0.205 0.055
F 113.716 108.980 114.277 36.583 41.614 35.898 38.053 36.580 132.078 42.743
Results with Treatment Status
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Post X Treatment -0.234** -0.225+ -0.139 -0.488*** -1.222*** -0.243 -0.601*** 0.205** -1.151*** 0.188+
(0.085) (0.116) (0.125) (0.043) (0.163) (0.150) (0.167) (0.060) (0.196) (0.106)
Observations 1045 1264 2295 1599 587 1493 1479 1447 1297 1370
R2 0.114 0.199 0.088 0.128 0.089 0.187 0.128 0.073 0.205 0.054
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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Table A.5 Regression Results for those ages 35-44
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.016 0.019 -0.024** -0.130*** -0.038+ -0.115+ -0.148** 0.096*** -0.050 0.247***
(0.022) (0.015) (0.009) (0.026) (0.019) (0.063) (0.044) (0.012) (0.088) (0.036)
Observations 963 1258 2213 1680 582 1588 1577 1533 1345 1230
R2 0.114 0.148 0.141 0.075 0.083 0.138 0.108 0.063 0.177 0.064
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.027 0.024 -0.020* -0.138*** -0.076*** -0.111 -0.149** 0.075*** -0.089 0.180***
(0.029) (0.018) (0.009) (0.033) (0.019) (0.075) (0.057) (0.015) (0.097) (0.042)
Observations 963 1258 2213 1680 582 1588 1577 1533 1345 1230
R2 0.114 0.148 0.141 0.075 0.082 0.138 0.108 0.062 0.177 0.063
F 57.559 151.248 94.628 30.315 61.255 31.277 30.527 29.520 129.180 84.061
Results with Treatment Status
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Post X Treatment -0.234** -0.225+ -0.139 -0.488*** -1.222*** -0.243 -0.601*** 0.205** -1.151*** 0.188+
(0.085) (0.116) (0.125) (0.043) (0.163) (0.150) (0.167) (0.060) (0.196) (0.106)
Observations 1045 1264 2295 1599 587 1493 1479 1447 1297 1370
R2 0.114 0.199 0.088 0.128 0.089 0.187 0.128 0.073 0.205 0.054
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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Table A.6 Regression Results for those ages 45-54
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.009 -0.028+ -0.050+ -0.062* -0.029 -0.162** -0.175** -0.059*** -0.128* 0.232***
(0.041) (0.015) (0.026) (0.030) (0.024) (0.049) (0.053) (0.013) (0.058) (0.065)
Observations 724 801 1519 1240 426 1161 1157 1136 972 715
R2 0.131 0.166 0.113 0.123 0.105 0.174 0.123 0.082 0.152 0.110
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density 0.021 -0.031+ -0.069* -0.025 -0.030 -0.236** -0.147* -0.032 -0.050 0.128
(0.046) (0.018) (0.028) (0.044) (0.024) (0.085) (0.075) (0.021) (0.063) (0.093)
Observations 724 801 1519 1240 426 1161 1157 1136 972 715
R2 0.131 0.166 0.113 0.123 0.105 0.173 0.123 0.081 0.152 0.108
F 165.412 69.005 85.563 27.116 90.354 26.217 26.650 28.072 87.068 69.598
Results with Treatment Status
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Post X Treatment -0.102 -0.043 -0.175 -0.351*** -0.078 -0.557** -0.876*** -0.234*** -0.284 0.473***
(0.165) (0.067) (0.125) (0.084) (0.074) (0.195) (0.169) (0.049) (0.194) (0.121)
Observations 724 801 1519 1240 426 1161 1157 1136 972 715
R2 0.132 0.165 0.112 0.123 0.105 0.172 0.124 0.081 0.152 0.108
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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Table A.7 Regression Results for those ages 55-64
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.060 -0.004 -0.018 -0.063 0.060 0.136+ 0.098 0.061* -0.273* 0.398**
(0.045) (0.006) (0.025) (0.090) (0.085) (0.069) (0.086) (0.028) (0.127) (0.131)
Observations 500 428 923 734 226 702 694 673 618 395
R2 0.180 0.099 0.180 0.123 0.154 0.167 0.198 0.095 0.283 0.132
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.098+ -0.003 -0.054* 0.084 0.179 0.141+ 0.225** 0.068+ -0.262+ 0.356**
(0.050) (0.005) (0.026) (0.157) (0.129) (0.073) (0.076) (0.038) (0.147) (0.124)
Observations 500 428 923 734 226 702 694 673 618 395
R2 0.180 0.099 0.180 0.120 0.152 0.167 0.196 0.095 0.283 0.132
F 68.092 76.119 83.043 37.848 47.570 38.157 30.915 35.804 153.825 40.341
Results with Treatment Status
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Post X Treatment -0.542** -0.004 -0.158 -0.781** 0.515 0.523 0.845* 0.308* -1.171* 0.566**
(0.158) (0.010) (0.097) (0.226) (0.312) (0.343) (0.318) (0.118) (0.550) (0.192)
Observations 500 428 923 734 226 702 694 673 618 395
R2 0.187 0.099 0.181 0.127 0.156 0.166 0.201 0.096 0.282 0.126
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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Table A.8 Regression Results for 65 and older
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.022 -0.005 -0.016 0.050 -0.154 0.094 0.130 0.075 -0.006 -0.028
(0.029) (0.009) (0.036) (0.150) (0.390) (0.147) (0.138) (0.058) (0.147) (0.148)
Observations 471 191 659 509 151 480 469 454 431 243
R2 0.130 0.084 0.106 0.131 0.174 0.135 0.135 0.129 0.197 0.215
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.016 -0.016 -0.030 0.055 -0.842* 0.096 0.148 0.016 0.524 0.010
(0.028) (0.012) (0.044) (0.157) (0.359) (0.172) (0.139) (0.040) (0.466) (0.198)
Observations 471 191 659 509 151 480 469 454 431 243
R2 0.130 0.082 0.106 0.131 0.168 0.135 0.135 0.128 0.193 0.215
F 38.222 46.339 56.420 312.760 33.599 268.066 379.323 242.162 14.190 91.589
Results with Treatment Status
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Post X Treatment 0.071 0.042 0.032 0.079 0.075 0.147 -0.183 0.031 -0.118 -0.308
(0.091) (0.029) (0.142) (0.235) (0.078) (0.266) (0.239) (0.038) (0.234) (0.244)
Observations 471 191 659 509 151 480 469 454 431 243
R2 0.130 0.085 0.106 0.131 0.174 0.135 0.134 0.127 0.197 0.216
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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Results with Education Categories
Table A.9 Regression Results for illiterate or literate with no diploma
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.088 0.001 0.012 0.090 0.008 -0.192* -0.010 0.081 -0.045 0.020
(0.055) (0.004) (0.019) (0.102) (0.034) (0.093) (0.228) (0.094) (0.078) (0.086)
Observations 168 375 537 328 99 270 267 253 249 275
R2 0.473 0.060 0.161 0.139 0.174 0.195 0.195 0.146 0.231 0.130
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.136** -0.005 -0.005 0.039 0.004 -0.328** 0.069 0.252* -0.054 0.020
(0.047) (0.004) (0.017) (0.116) (0.032) (0.108) (0.263) (0.101) (0.081) (0.100)
Observations 168 375 537 328 99 270 267 253 249 275
R2 0.471 0.059 0.161 0.138 0.174 0.193 0.194 0.130 0.231 0.130
F 122.523 98.682 111.930 58.015 2984.404 55.574 54.411 51.007 154.788 612.948
Results with Treatment Status
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Post X Treatment -0.349 0.039* 0.033 0.268+ 0.062 -0.198 -0.513+ -0.289+ -0.392 -0.066
(0.214) (0.015) (0.065) (0.158) (0.133) (0.214) (0.286) (0.160) (0.292) (0.154)
Observations 168 375 537 328 99 270 267 253 249 275
R2 0.473 0.061 0.161 0.138 0.175 0.192 0.197 0.146 0.231 0.130
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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Table A.10 Regression Results for primary school graduates
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.033+ 0.025** -0.026* -0.064+ 0.008 -0.007 -0.112** 0.051** -0.083 0.203**
(0.017) (0.007) (0.010) (0.032) (0.027) (0.044) (0.036) (0.015) (0.063) (0.063)
Observations 1497 1409 2895 2159 627 1942 1923 1845 1587 1396
R2 0.141 0.016 0.071 0.103 0.075 0.125 0.103 0.055 0.203 0.055
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.030+ 0.028** -0.021+ -0.028 0.067 -0.041 -0.120** 0.026 -0.110 0.194**
(0.016) (0.009) (0.011) (0.049) (0.046) (0.054) (0.040) (0.021) (0.069) (0.063)
Observations 1497 1409 2895 2159 627 1942 1923 1845 1587 1396
R2 0.141 0.016 0.071 0.103 0.074 0.125 0.103 0.055 0.203 0.055
F 93.696 98.483 99.004 34.193 50.308 33.796 32.497 33.494 181.536 99.080
Results with Treatment Status
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Post X Treatment -0.142* 0.068* -0.100* -0.334** 0.057 -0.043 -0.483* 0.132+ -0.472 0.370**
(0.069) (0.029) (0.040) (0.099) (0.092) (0.164) (0.186) (0.066) (0.294) (0.133)
Observations 1497 1409 2895 2159 627 1942 1923 1845 1587 1396
R2 0.141 0.014 0.071 0.103 0.075 0.125 0.102 0.054 0.203 0.053
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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Table A.11 Regression Results for high school graduates
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.050** -0.040* -0.038* -0.130*** -0.182*** -0.142*** -0.128*** 0.052** -0.237*** 0.205**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.036) (0.033) (0.018) (0.060) (0.067)
Observations 1859 1841 3684 2823 1059 2748 2735 2664 2265 2179
R2 0.064 0.059 0.072 0.094 0.053 0.135 0.095 0.053 0.185 0.068
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.080** -0.042* -0.034 -0.143*** -0.167*** -0.152** -0.133** 0.046* -0.152** 0.141*
(0.025) (0.020) (0.022) (0.031) (0.029) (0.049) (0.042) (0.023) (0.056) (0.058)
Observations 1859 1841 3684 2823 1059 2748 2735 2664 2265 2179
R2 0.063 0.059 0.072 0.094 0.053 0.135 0.095 0.053 0.185 0.068
F 90.527 75.920 87.528 26.969 42.162 25.730 27.351 27.869 94.335 55.165
Results with Treatment Status
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Post X Treatment -0.134* -0.211* -0.201** -0.527*** -0.663*** -0.492** -0.372** 0.293*** -0.751*** 0.279**
(0.061) (0.083) (0.071) (0.085) (0.088) (0.165) (0.111) (0.036) (0.141) (0.100)
Observations 1859 1841 3684 2823 1059 2748 2735 2664 2265 2179
R2 0.063 0.060 0.073 0.093 0.051 0.133 0.093 0.054 0.184 0.066
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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Table A.12 Regression Results for university graduates
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density 0.027 -0.010 -0.012 -0.033 -0.236*** -0.027 -0.088* 0.024** 0.012 0.293***
(0.021) (0.032) (0.021) (0.055) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.009) (0.076) (0.066)
Observations 1099 1030 2117 1534 538 1494 1477 1466 1454 1105
R2 0.093 0.118 0.084 0.117 0.082 0.143 0.093 0.041 0.128 0.120
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density 0.046+ -0.009 -0.020 -0.065 -0.185*** -0.016 -0.073+ 0.029* -0.053 0.210+
(0.025) (0.038) (0.024) (0.059) (0.029) (0.040) (0.043) (0.013) (0.076) (0.119)
Observations 1099 1030 2117 1534 538 1494 1477 1466 1454 1105
R2 0.093 0.118 0.084 0.116 0.081 0.143 0.093 0.041 0.127 0.119
F 64.597 56.093 62.084 52.038 57.968 51.221 52.707 43.304 52.106 16.446
Results with Treatment Status
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Post X Treatment 0.039 -0.055 -0.078 -0.437* -0.828*** -0.177 -0.473*** 0.107*** -0.148 0.629***
(0.077) (0.152) (0.097) (0.189) (0.085) (0.117) (0.108) (0.030) (0.308) (0.074)
Observations 1099 1030 2117 1534 538 1494 1477 1466 1454 1105
R2 0.092 0.118 0.084 0.118 0.078 0.143 0.094 0.041 0.128 0.119
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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Identification with Syrian density without gender and age distinctions
Table A.13 Regression Results
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.005** -0.001 -0.005** -0.015* -0.020*** -0.015+ -0.020** 0.008*** -0.027*** 0.037***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)
N 4623 4655 9233 6844 2323 6454 6402 6228 5555 4955
R2 0.089 0.130 0.095 0.098 0.065 0.133 0.103 0.048 0.177 0.062
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.007* -0.001 -0.005* -0.015+ -0.019*** -0.019+ -0.023** 0.009*** -0.025*** 0.031***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 4623 4655 9233 6844 2323 6454 6402 6228 5555 4955
R2 0.088 0.130 0.095 0.098 0.065 0.133 0.103 0.048 0.177 0.062
F 73.647 72.024 73.533 22.656 40.032 22.053 22.182 22.313 91.888 65.382
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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Results with the data of 2015 Census
Table A.14 Difference-in-Difference Results
Respective Years Included
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.004** 0.001 -0.003** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 0.004** -0.016*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
N 2525 2561 5061 2669 2323 2333 2322 2218 3294 4955
R2 0.096 0.154 0.103 0.032 0.067 0.083 0.071 0.034 0.126 0.063
All Years Included
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.003** -0.001 -0.002* -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.007+ -0.010** 0.004*** -0.012** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
N 4623 4655 9233 6844 2323 6454 6402 6228 5555 4955
R2 0.089 0.130 0.095 0.099 0.067 0.133 0.103 0.048 0.177 0.063
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions.
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Possible Confounding
Table A.15 Regression Results
Difference-in-Difference Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.023* -0.004 -0.025** -0.066* -0.144*** -0.063+ -0.109*** 0.045*** -0.130*** 0.215***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.031) (0.022) (0.032) (0.029) (0.007) (0.036) (0.042)
N 4623 4655 9233 6844 2323 6454 6402 6228 5555 4955
R2 0.088 0.130 0.096 0.098 0.067 0.133 0.103 0.048 0.177 0.064
Instrumental Variable Results
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Syrian Density -0.031* -0.002 -0.023* -0.067+ -0.097* -0.084+ -0.109** 0.041*** -0.119*** 0.160***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.039) (0.039) (0.047) (0.037) (0.008) (0.036) (0.037)
Observations 4623 4655 9233 6844 2323 6454 6402 6228 5555 4955
R2 0.088 0.130 0.095 0.098 0.066 0.133 0.103 0.048 0.177 0.064
F 91.229 88.857 90.844 36.199 37.644 35.189 35.330 35.614 107.228 74.758
Results with Treatment Status
Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Hypothesis III Hypothesis IV
a b c a b c d
Post X Treatment -0.099* -0.042 -0.128*** -0.459*** -0.454*** -0.226+ -0.442*** 0.182*** -0.559*** 0.363***
(0.042) (0.056) (0.035) (0.069) (0.085) (0.125) (0.102) (0.032) (0.137) (0.060)
N 4623 4655 9233 6844 2323 6454 6402 6228 5555 4955
R2 0.089 0.131 0.096 0.099 0.065 0.133 0.102 0.048 0.177 0.062
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.
Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."
First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.
Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."
Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."
Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."
Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host socities’ dissatisfaction wtih government performance on decreasing inequality."
Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."
Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."
Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democarcy in the host society."
Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.
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